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Deepwater Horizon Accident - 2010 Deepwater-Horizon (SYSTEM PARTS…
Deepwater Horizon Accident - 2010
SYSTEM PARTS
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Staff
Monitoring Crew
It was discovered that the watch officers were not properly trained to react to the warning signs and conditions of this accident (NAENRC 2012).
Crew members
It was also found that crew members dealing with the situation, were not trained to be able to understand all systems and components. This meant that crew members would have lacked the ability to identify and respond to events (NAENRC 2012).
No body in charge of the situation! # #
Once systems started to fail, there was no chain of command. Everyone acted on their own, and this lack of procedure lead to a lack of understanding of the situation and overall resulted in the 11 deaths that night
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Human Relations
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How to keep so many people in close workspace and living spaces for so long
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SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE
1: Concept & Design
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There would be external pressures by the company to get the rig designed and constructed to start earning money
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- Construction / Manufacture
Resources
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The whole rig costed roughly $350 million to build. It took from December 1998 until February 2001 to construct (Nguyen, T, Mohamed, I 2014).
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3: Commissioning
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Leasing
BP rented the Deepwater Horizon at a cost of $500,000 per day (Nguyen, T, Mohamed, I 2014)
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4: Operating
The rig is expected to handle large storms with waves of 41 feet, and wind speeds of 103 knots (Transocean 2010).
The rig costs BP $500,000 per day
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Over 100 workers on board that need to be entertained, provided with food, water and living space
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6: Decommissioning
Top half of the rig is removed from the structure below and taken back to shore in order to re-use or recycle.
The structure below the waterline that supported the oil rig is cut off below the mudline and brought to shore in order to sell for money or use for scraps
If the structure meets proper regulations, it can be set on the bottom of the ocean floor and used to create an artificial reef
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PEOPLE
INDIVIDUAL FACTORS
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Expectations
Workers were under the same mindset that they were working in a very safe environment and this can lead to the idea that nothing will happen because nothing already has happened
4 Senior BP members flew in prior to the accident to congratulate and celebrate the long term safety record (Barstow, D et al 2010).
Fatigue:
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Crew members are at work for anywhere between 2-6 weeks at a time before getting time off (Living on an offshore oil rig 2016)
Potential influence on the ability to think and operate under fatigue # #
MANAGEMENT
JOB DESIGN
ROSTERS/WORKLOAD
Workers on offshore oil rigs typically work at a period of between 2 and 6 weeks before returning home and getting time off (Living on an offshore oil rig 2016).
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Inability to maintain a set body cycle leading to fatigue #
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The crew members in charge of monitoring systems had been under-trained. They were expected to know and understand all systems on board so that they could react accordingly to any unusual responses by any system (NAENRC 2012).
SUPERVISION
The role of a supervisor is to watch over all operations, and have the ability to step in and make decisions if something goes wrong.
When everything was going wrong on this evening, no one took charge, everyone panicked and worked on their own and without someone giving directions or orders
In the investigation, it was discovered that there was a change of supervisor shift right before one of the major testing operations.
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INFORMATION TRANSFER
After the failed test, someone came up with the possibility that it was a natural effect that caused the results to fail
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Communication regarding the abandonment procedures were occurring way too close to the operation day
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WORKPLACE
EQUIPMENT DESIGN
All warning systems and indicators were centralized on the main deck. This made it easy to observe all system operations in the one location.
Some warning systems, however, required a worker to act on the warning, rather than having an automatic response by the system when activated (NAENRC 2012).
One of which was in the engine room, meaning that when the combustible gas detectors went off, the engines were able to keep running (NAENRC 2012).
FEEDBACK
In both tests conducted, one failed. Yet it was based on the interpretation from the crew to determine the results.
This can lead to disagreements amongst crew members, and potentially lead to a false interpretation
Blowout Preventer (BOP)
After investigations, it was discovered that there was a damaged solenoid on one side of the BOP, and the batteries on the other system were flat (British Petroleum 2010).
None of these discoveries were made prior to the accident. This means that there were no systems in place to provide warning of such failure.
There was no procedure followed to check these batteries and systems to ensure that if it was required, it would be operational.
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