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AI Philosophical Foundation (Weak AI (Viewpoints (Engineering viewpoint…

- - - - “Artificial intelligence pursued within the cult of computationalism stands
        not even a ghost of a chance of producing durable results”
    - - “Every aspect of learning or any other feature
        of intelligence can be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it.”
  - - - The argument from disability
        
        turing test
    - - Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem
    - - “argument from informality of behavior
- - - - the machine has to be aware of its own
        mental states and actions.
    - - the question of whether the machine’s purported beliefs, desires, and other representations are actually “about” something in the real world.
    - - the study of direct experience: the machine has to
        actually feel emotions
- - - - it makes no sense to consider the brain separately: cognition takes place within a body, which is embedded in an environment.
  - - - the qualification problem.
        
        many of the issues Dreyfus has focused on—background commonsense knowledge, the qualification problem, uncertainty, learning, compiled forms of decision making—are indeed important issues, and have by now been incorporated into standard intelligent agent design. In our view, this is evidence of AI’s progress, not of its impossibility.
- - - - The problem for physicalists is to explain how physical states—in particular, the molecular configurations and elecrochemical processes of the brain—can simultaneously be mental states,
    - - physicalism allows, at least in principle, for the possibility of strong AI.