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Cryptography (Appendix (Congruence modulo), Chapter 4 (4.2 (Side chain…

- - - - Solution
        
        Time stamp (T || m) and let the T skew within an acceptable range
        
        The time elapsing is an issue
        
        Sequence number (counter)
        
        Might have package loss
    - - Even when A generates a t' such that passed the tag verification of the old message m is considered A win
        
        Thus we need to eliminate the case that Verif(t', m) in a sMac
      - Prop 4.4 Let \Pi be a scheme that is MAC secure and uses the carnonical verification (i.e. t' = MAC(m), and we need to have t' = t, where t is the output of A). Then \PI is a strong MAC (-secure).
    - - Implementing the difference of delay time in each rejection to get the i-th byte value of a tag.
        
        Starting is just length of tag is i = 0
        
        Keep adding new bits when get the result from the time-elapse attack (side-chain attack)
      - X-Box 360 used this kind of verification and been attacked
      - Using a time-independent string comparison is very crucial
        
        HOW/What?