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NUCLEAR QUESTION (Critical Evaluation - (Instead of removing CMD feature,…
NUCLEAR QUESTION
Critical Evaluation -
The first three principles shows that India envisages its nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence for defensive purposes and not for offensive purpose.
Bharat Karnad has been critical of NFU. It is morally wrong as it puts our population under huge threat. There is no logic in accepting large scale destruction in first strike. Former MoD Parrikar has also been critical of NFU. However, tampering with NFU may lead to arms race and may increase security dilemma.
Credible Minimum Deterrence: This feature will work only when the other party is convinced that a country has a credible deterrence. Purpose of communicating this aspect was to project India’s nuclear programme as defensive rather than offensive. It fails to convince others unless India clarifies what credible deterrence means. Adversary may take chance. It is said that Pak actually tried to test credible deterrence in Kargil conflict. It should be credible deterrence instead.
Instead of massive retaliation India should adopt flexible response. As Pak is developing tactical weapons, there is need to change doctrine from counter value to counter force.
At present, the major security threat to India comes from non-state actors. Like France, India should also include the use of nuclear weapons in case of terror attack.
C Rajamohan - Our infra for second strike capability is inadequate and there is need to appoint Chief of Defence Staff as suggested by NK Chandra committee.
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It is based on Cold War approach of the two superpowers (MAD doctrine). However, MAD has lost relevance in present context.
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Instead of removing CMD feature, India should make its deterrence credible by taking following steps -
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Conclusion - Instead of revising the current doctrine, India should strengthen its Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability. A limited BMD system increases deterrence by denial. It would also strengthen India’s NFU as survival of Nuclear Command and Control structure is necessary for a second strike. The deterrent effect of BMD is also applicable against non-state actors.
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