3.2 Distribution to whom, by whom
A Coggle Diagram about Rights
(Human rights and natural rights
Fitzpatrick et al 2014: 10
- natural rights are historically theologically driven (Fitzpatrick et al 2014: 5)
"Human rights are most often encapsulated in international agreements and instruments, many of which encompass “positive” social rights, including rights to housing."Fitzpatrick et al 2014: 11
"human rights-based verdicts can be viewed, as we have argued above, as primarily moral statements, bringing ethical pressure to bear on relevant states to take measures to change their policy and proce- dures. Such a moral interpretation of human rights accords with the sentiments of human rights advocates and organizations, who take the position that the rights spec- ified in these international instruments make “moral claims on the behaviour of indi- vidual and collective agents, and on the design of social arrangements” (UNDP"
- Fitzpatrick et al 2014: 14 Justify human rights on the consequentialist position that they do more good than harm. Corresponds to Nussbaum/Sen outcome-oriented approach
, Social rights, rights of citizenshipFitzpatrick et al 2014: 6
"we see the classic Marshallian concept of “social citizenship” as a conceptually useful bridge between these philosophical and political levels, because his attempt to describe the historical development of modern society, while not normative in itself, readily lends itself to a normative interpretation, with its transparent implication that citizens are entitled to the array of rights he describes." #
, What is the scope of rights?
, The Needs-Rights nexusDean 2014
"Discussions of human need are widely framed in terms of whether it is absolute or culturally relative (e.g. Doyal & Gough, 1991). Similarly, discussions of social rights - rights to health and social care, to housing or education and/or to a protected standard of living - have been framed in terms of whether they are realisable imperatives, or merely aspirational goals"
Fitzpatrick et al 2014: 4
- more on this in book chapter if required. Suffice to say that the ways in which needs are related to rights is contested and linked to the different models/regimes of welfare and social citizenship
"These sorts of arguments are, thus, not only highly relevant to our concerns pertaining to rights to shelter and/or housing, but they are also intuitively appealing, based as they are on the common sense premise that people have a right to what they need – albeit that positivists might argue that they illegitimately derive an “Ought” from an “Is”.However, even if it is accepted that the “Is/Ought gap” can be bridged by statements about human need, McLachlin (1998) gives good reasons for resisting any simple equation of needs and rights: there are many things we need but cannot be provided to us as of right. Ignatieff (1984), for example, argues that love, belong- ing, dignity and respect are all things that we need which cannot be provided within a framework of rights"
Fitzpatrick et al 2014: 2-3
- a way of implementing the chosen distributional measure?
"A key controversy, and source of confusion, in the general rights discourse has to do with the origin of rights; whether rights are given by nature, or – somehow – socially constructed. “Natural rights” are seen as inalienable and held by all human beings on the basis of religious or other innate norms or principles. “Socially constructed rights”, in contrast, are contingent upon socially shared norms, customs or beliefs within a community or culture. How the origin of rights is perceived also carries strong implications for their application. If rights are seen as natural, it is nearer at hand to treat them as universal and non-negotiable than if they are seen as constructed in a certain social context."..."Natural rights have largely been concerned with people’s “negative” (freedom) rights rather than “positive” rights to substantive welfare entitlements such as housing"
), Citizenship and the state
and Principles by which a person's entitlement to social rights may be constitutedDean 2011: 26
"three different ways in which a person might be thought to belong within a particular society (see also Grieco 2002; Sivanandan 1989).
- The first is jus soli. This principle establishes that a person has rights on the basis of where she is born: one belongs in the land of one's birth.
- The second principle is jus sanguinis, which establishes that a person has rights on the basis of her lineage or descent: one belongs with the people with whom one shares the ties of common blood. -
- The third principle is jus domicilii, which establishes that a person has rights on the basis of where she is resident and has chosen to live: one belongs where one is permanently domiciled."